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The Good Friday Agreement signed in Belfast in 1998, but still in a process of 
development, is one of a number of peace agreements emerging from apparently 
intractable conflicts, since the end of the cold war.  This article focuses on a relatively 
unexamined aspect of the Agreement - the international relevance of its innovative 
provisions on equality of citizenship and internationalised governance.  The Belfast 
Agreement both implicitly and explicitly deals with the problematic issue of 
citizenship in a state which is highly contested at the constitutional level.  Its 
development of an equality agenda and dynamic cross-border institutions of 
governance in a situation where ultimate sovereignty and allegiance remains 
contested is a departure from current international norms.  The peace process around 
the Agreement also reflects a significantly increased international involvement in the 
Northern Ireland conflict.  External support and mediation was essential in brokering 
an Agreement and will inevitably be important in sustaining the new forms of 
citizenship which are promised in its provisions.  Both in its processes and in the 
framework for citizenship and governance suggested by the Agreement, Northern 
Ireland can provide a useful example to the increasing number of nationalist conflicts 
in the post cold war world.  
 
The Northern Ireland peace process and the Good Friday Agreement offer a number 
of challenges to the international literature on citizenship, which has to date not 
engaged with the issues and problems thrown up when the nature and existence of the 
state are contested.  This is reflected in the theoretical assumptions about the nature of 
citizenship that have underpinned political analysis of the Northern Ireland conflict 
and its potential solutions.  The dominant analysis assumes that most nationalists 
would prioritise justice and equality over constitutional issues,1 and secondly that 
unionists prioritise the Union over discriminatory measures and would support 
internal reform if the constitutional threat were removed.2  These assumptions are 
based on the idea that the existing state will gain legitimacy and the conflict will end 
when nationalists are offered and  accept full citizenship of the British state.  The 
conflict resolution strategies resulting from this approach sharply divided sovereignty 
                                                          
1 e.g. Smith, David and Gerald Chambers, Inequality in Northern Ireland.  Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
1991). 
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and equality and sought a trade-off between the two.  This strategy failed for a 
number of reasons.  Firstly, it is not clear that nationalists are in fact willing to 
abandon nationalism for justice.  Neither is there any evidence that unionists see such 
a trade off as practicable or in their interests.  Rather, as discussed below, Ulster 
unionists fear that concessions on issues of equality would strengthen Irish 
nationalism and weaken the Union.  Thus exclusion of nationalists from the public 
sphere and full citizenship continues to be an important element of modern Ulster 
unionism. 
 
The Northern Ireland peace process and the Good Friday Agreement have made 
progress because they abandoned previous dogma which saw equality as a concession 
to be granted once the constitutional challenge to the Northern state was ended.  The 
Agreement has sought to fundamentally change the nature of citizenship, by dividing 
issues of citizenship rights, institutions of governance and the ethos of the state from 
the question of formal sovereignty.  The debate on the equality agenda has therefore 
become part of the definition of citizenship rather than a material ‘carrot’ to entice 
people away from the allegedly symbolic arena of nationalism.  If the Good Friday 
Agreement succeeds it will have done do without requiring nationalists or unionists to 
abandon their political goals or their political and ethnic identities.  It will have 
established power-sharing government, implemented a wide-ranging process of 
internal reform and established significant and dynamic supranational institutions of 
governance.   
 
Within Northern Ireland the major source of opposition to the Agreement has come 
from the unionist population.  Their disagreements with the peace process are not 
confined to the central constitutional issues but also embrace the reform provisions 
around the equality agenda.  This absolute rejection of the extension of citizenship 
rights which would be seen as uncontroversial in most democratic states, to the 
nationalist population, is incomprehensible in the context of the mainstream academic 
literature on citizenship and highlights its inadequacy in contested states.  The debate 
on equality in Northern Ireland - reflected in such issues as policing, fair employment, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
2 e.g. pamphlets by the Cadogan Group, Lost Accord: The 1995 Frameworks and the Search for a 
Settlement in Northern Ireland, 1995 and Square Circles: Round Tables and the Path to Peace in 
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cultural rights and Orange marches - has been highly controversial because the issues 
involved clearly reflect the contested nature of the state in Northern Ireland. Unionists 
do not see the demand for ‘parity of esteem’ or ‘equality of citizenship’ as an 
unproblematic demand for the granting of democratic rights.   Equality issues are seen 
as inevitably bound up with the nature of the state.  Unionists feel threatened by the 
debate on equality of citizenship and ‘parity of esteem’ and know that their position is 
not understood by those outside the unionist community.  This is because the debate 
on equality has been associated with nationalist demands for change or even 
republican attempts to undermine the state.  Senior Ulster Unionist negotiator Dermot 
Nesbitt, speaking in the Northern Ireland Forum, articulated this clearly saying ‘we 
have a nationalist position that is portrayed as moderate, modern and forward thinking 
... on the other hand we are portrayed as hard-line, bigoted, sectarian and narrow-
minded’.3  Patricia Campbell (UUP) produces  a typical example of an argument that 
makes little sense outside of unionists’ own framework, when she says that ‘the Sinn 
Féin pursuit of the equality agenda stands between us and our goal of a just society.  It 
is perceived as part of their attack on our state and our being, an effort to undermine 
our society’.4 In a similar vein, Jim Rodgers (UUP) in an attack on Sinn Féin 
councillors says that they ‘were churning out their hate, as usual, lecturing the council 
about “parity of esteem”, equality, inclusiveness’.5  Unionists themselves are aware 
that they are often speaking in terms which are misunderstood outside Northern 
Ireland.   Their poor external image has been a constant feature in unionist discourse 
and, at least until the late 1980s, and to some extent until today, it resulted in a 
withdrawal from analytical debate.6  The rejection by mainstream unionism of the 
extension of full and equal citizenship to northern nationalists on the grounds that it 
would weaken the Union is at the heart of their opposition to the Good Friday 
Agreement.  Given the weakness of dissident nationalist and republican movements it 
is the unionist opposition which offers the greatest barrier to the successful 
implementation of the Agreement and therefore an understanding of their perspective 
is essential to political progress. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Northern Ireland, (Belfast, 1996). 
3NI Forum, 3 Oct. 1997, vol. 45, p. 52. 
4 Irish News, 19 May 1998. 
5 NI Forum, 20 Feb. 1998, vol. 62, p.38. 
6  Arthur Aughey, Under Siege: Ulster Unionism and the Anglo-Irish Agreement, (Belfast: Blackstaff, 
1989), vii. 
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Citizenship in a Contested State 
Unionists’ rejection of the ‘equality agenda’ put forward by nationalists on the 
grounds that it threatens the Union, is not simply paranoia, or a cultural predisposition 
to reduce all matters to history or sovereignty.7  In a sense, unionist elites are right.  
The Northern Ireland state is contested on all fronts.  The refusal of nationalists to 
support the RUC, their desire to include nationalist symbols in the public sphere, 
opposition to Orange marches and the desire for stronger fair employment legislation 
are not just individual stand alone issues of justice.  They are for nationalists part of a 
broader political programme.  Gerry Adams was quite explicit in arguing that if 
unionism rests on power and privilege, as he believed it did, then the mobilisation of a 
nationalist consensus with sufficient international support to make progress on an 
‘equality agenda’ would weaken unionism.8  Sinn Féin recognised that such a 
consensus could not be mobilised to press for a British withdrawal, but that it could 
be built around ‘equality’ issues and North-South links and it would be difficult for 
the British government to resist the pressure for reform. 
 
Mainstream unionism does not believe that making compromises on equality and 
citizenship will secure the Union or even that it can be done without endangering the 
state.  This is most clearly expressed in the debate around the issue of consent, where 
mainstream unionists have argued that a ‘guarantee’ on the final handover of 
sovereignty is irrelevant if unionists cannot prevent changes in the actual ethos and 
governance of the state.9  Reform measures are opposed not only on their own merits 
but because they represent a shift in the political resources available to each 
community.  They are part of the ‘war of position’ over the future of Northern Ireland, 
part of the hegemonic battle which precedes the struggle for ultimate political power.10   
Each of the key areas of the equality agenda in Northern Ireland, would be described 
                                                          
7 See Maurna Crozier , Cultural Traditions in Ireland, (Belfast: Institute of Irish Studies, Queens 
University Belfast, 1989), 20. 
8 See Gerry Adams Free Ireland: Towards a Lasting Peace, ( Dingle, Co. Kerry: Brandon, 1995), 231. 
9 e.g. David Trimble, NI Forum, 12 Sept. 1997, vol. 42, p.3. 
Anthony Alcock, NI Forum, 6 June 1997, vol. 33, p. 38. 
Bob McCartney, NI Forum, 6 June 1997, vol. 33, p.4. 
UUP Response to Frameworks for the Future, 1995 [on www.uup.org, 20 May 1997]. 
10 Phrase ‘war of position’  from Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks.  Q. Hoare 
and G. Nowell Smith eds. (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971).  
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in the international literature as citizen-rights within a state, yet in spite of this, 
reforms in these areas are seen by unionists as having the potential to undermine the 
state.  If the nature of citizenship in Northern Ireland is changed, mainstream 
unionists believe that nationalists will use their increased economic, political and 
cultural resources to challenge the constitutional position.11 
 
The demands made by nationalists for reform under the banner of equality reflect this 
link between citizen rights and the contested nature of the state in Northern Ireland.  
Mainstream unionists believe that police reform will weaken the capacity of the state 
to defend itself, as nationalist recruits, nationalist influenced controlling bodies and a 
force with a non-unionist ethos would not be committed to the defence of the Union.12  
Even symbolic changes to the RUC's name or use of emblems were rejected.13  Ken 
Maginnis, attacked proposals to replace the symbols and Royal prefix of the RUC, 
claiming that this would produce a ‘neutered RUC, bereft of identity and effectiveness 
from a lack of self confidence’.  Likewise, he rejected the need to replace the oath of 
allegiance to the Queen because taking the oath shows ‘loyalty to the state, the 
constitution …  towards those subjects who seek the maintenance of their freedom, 
civil rights and security and protection against crime and subversion’.14  Those 
refusing to swear allegiance to the Queen are, in Maginnis’ view, not suitable police 
officers.   
 
Fair employment legislation is seen by the major unionist parties to weaken the link 
between loyalty and material rewards, reduce nationalist emigration and shift the 
population balance.  It increases the economic resources and ultimately the political 
resources available to nationalism, through its impact in key institutions such as the 
civil service.15  Mainstream unionist parties also reject the need to include nationalist 
cultural symbols in the public sphere, or reduce the use of exclusively British or 
                                                          
11 Peter King (UUP), Ulster Review, no. 23, Autumn 1997. 
12 Peter Weir (UUP), NI Forum, 23 Jan. 1998, vol. 58, p.44. 
13 e.g. Ken Maginnis, House of Commons, 15 Dec. 1997, vol. 303, col. 61-9. 
David Trimble in same debate at col. 96. 
Extensive debate in NI Forum 23 Jan. 1998, vol. 58. 
14 Ken Maginnis, House of Commons, 15 Dec. 1997, cols. 63 & 69. 
15 e.g. John Taylor, House of Commons , NI Committee, 16 May 1991, col. 14. 
Orange Standard, July 1993. 
Response by UUP to SACHR Review of fair employment legislation, 4 Jan. 1996 [www.uup.org, 29 
Nov. 1996]. 
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unionist symbols, because such action reduces the ‘Britishness’ of Northern Ireland,16 
and the dropping of the British anthem at Queen’s University Belfast, for example, 
was a hugely important issue for unionists.  As Bob McCartney said, it was irrelevant 
that most British universities did not play the anthem at graduations, since their 
Britishness was not in question.17  The increased number of Orange marches since the 
signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement is also an expression of this need to capture the 
public space as Orange marches are an effective means of demonstrating communal 
power and solidarity.  The right to march in any part of Northern Ireland is important 
for unionists because they reject the idea that there are ‘nationalist’ areas.  Ian Paisley 
jnr., speaking about Drumcree, for example, claimed that ‘the media repeatedly and 
wrongly insisted that this was a march through a Catholic area.  The parade at 
Drumcree was a march past an area where many Roman Catholics live … the Queen's 
highway’.18  Likewise Robert McCartney said the Drumcree crisis was ‘effectively 
about setting up a "defacto" section of the Republic of Ireland in Northern Ireland’.19     
Unionists make these direct links between citizenship rights and state authority 
because the state is contested and unsettled.  Citizenship for mainstream unionists is 
inevitably an expression of rights and duties, which exists to support the state and 
which can only be expressed in that context. 
 
The peace process has also seen unionist politicians publicly express their fears that 
internal reform based on ‘parity of esteem’, allied with North-South links, would 
weaken support for unionism among elements of their own community.20  A very 
simplistic view of European Union functionalism is often utilised to argue that North-
South bodies would inevitably develop deep and wide roots and that the people 
involved in them would ‘go native’ and lose their allegiance to unionism.21  Unionist 
political elites have been openly critical of leading employers and  business 
organisations from their own community, seeing them as less than wholehearted in 
their support for the positions adopted by mainstream unionism and willing to at least 
                                                          
16 e.g. Jeffrey Donaldson, NI Forum, 20 June 1997, vol. 35, p.12. 
Ken Maginnis, Irish Independent, 21 Aug. 1986. 
17 Belfast Telegraph, 19 Jan. 1995. 
Similar views from David Trimble, Newsletter,  22 Dec. 1994. 
18 NI Forum, 19 July 1996, vol. 6, p. 41. 
19 Irish Times, 7 July 1997. 
20 e.g.  Cedric Wilson, NI Forum, 13 June 1997, vol. 34, p.41. 
21 e.g. Bob McCartney, NI Forum, 29 Nov. 1996, vol. 20. p.2-5. 
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partly shift their allegiance or their political practice for the economic benefits of a 
Dublin-Belfast economic corridor, all-Ireland or cross-Border EU funding 
arrangements and the promotion of tourism and investment on an all-Ireland basis.22 
 
It is clear that mainstream Ulster Unionism does not make a sharp distinction between 
issues of sovereignty and issues of governance and public policy in Northern Ireland.  
From fair employment and policing to Orange marches and North-South bodies Ulster 
unionism sees concessions on the nature of governance or on the equality agenda as 
weakening their political position and the economic, social and cultural  power of 
their community.  Progress on equal citizenship in Northern Ireland is therefore 
unlikely to be made based on a simple trade-off between equal citizenship and formal 
sovereignty. 
 
Citizenship in an International Context 
The increased focus on citizenship in the international academic literature in recent 
years reflects a global debate on the nature of individuals’ and communities’ 
relationship with the state.  Conflicting pressures in the global political environment - 
many of them related to the ending of the Cold War - have heightened the importance 
of these issues.  The nation-state as a construct is under pressure from economic 
globalisation and regional integration.  Yet the end of the Cold War has also 
unleashed a significant rise in nationalist challenges to existing states, not only in the 
Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe but in Africa and potentially in Western 
Europe.  The breakdown in the post-war consensus on the welfare state during the 
1980s has raised important questions about the rights and duties of citizens, which 
have yet to be resolved in either a new consensus or even clear alternative paradigms.  
The increased focus on individualism in the economic sphere has however been 
challenged by arguments to ‘extend citizenship’ to deal explicitly with inequality 
based on class, gender and race.23  
                                                          
22 e.g. St Clair McAlister (DUP), NI Forum, 20 Feb. 1998, vol. 62, p. 32. 
John Hunter (UUP), NI Forum, 24 Oct. 1997, vol. 48, p. 10, claims that ‘The sort of stooges that 
represent the business community tend to be of the pan-Nationalist front’. 
23 See for example, Raymond Plant, ‘Citizenship and Rights,’ pp. 1-32 in Raymond Plant and Norman 
Barry Citizenship and Rights in Thatcher’s Britain: Two Views, (London: IEA Health and Welfare 
Unit, 1990). 
Chantal Mouffe, Dimensions of Radical Democracy: Pluralism, Citizenship, Community, (London: 
Verso, 1992). 
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The very limited engagement with the idea of the contested state is, however, a 
crucial weakness in the contemporary literature on citizenship.  When the nature and 
boundaries of the state are contested, debates on the nature of citizenship are 
inevitably framed by that context.  The treatment of Palestinians in Israel or the 
Occupied Territories, of Russians in the Baltic states, or non-Russians in the 
peripheral Russian Republics is not adequately addressed by debates on ethnicity, 
minority rights or even citizen duties.  These issues are given a specific resonance 
when changes in the nature of citizenship are not simply about the distribution of 
rights and resources within the state but are part of a conflict over the existence of the 
state itself.  Citizenship as currently conceptualised in the international academic 
literature does  not therefore provide a framework in which equality can be developed 
in Northern Ireland.  The three dominant models of citizenship in the current 
international literature are so heavily premised on being constituted within an 
uncontested nation-state that they lose their strength in a situation such as Northern 
Ireland and can even reinforce the tendency for exclusion in unionist ideology.   
 
The Republican or assimilationist model of citizenship is clearly not appropriate in 
analysing current citizen-relations in Northern Ireland.  There is little evidence of 
assimilationist perspectives in mainstream unionists’ view of citizenship, rather 
exclusion has been the dominant response.  Mainstream unionists do not express the 
confidence of traditional French citizenship ideals, which would allow them to seek to 
absorb nationalists into their citizen community.  Such a move would be seen as 
inevitably threatening their own position.  The Republican model also assumes that 
all members of a society want to be citizens in the mould of existing citizens.  This is 
clearly not the case in a contested state.  In addition to offering inclusion, this 
approach allows the dominant community to insist on assimilation on their terms.  
Such insistence would deny nationalist identity and not provide the type of equality of 
citizenship which they seek.  Thus Norman Porter in his review of unionist political 
ideas, argues that even though Robert McCartney uses the language of individual 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Ruth Lister, Citizenship: feminist perspectives, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997). 
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rights, his vision is as exclusivist as traditional unionism in practice.24  This argument 
has been reinforced by McCartney's alliance with Paisley since the Good Friday 
Agreement.  Indeed McCartney himself was quite explicit that 'parity of esteem' in his 
view could only be offered to Catholics, not nationalists.25  
 
The multi-cultural model, in contrast to assimilationism, does allow for ethnic and 
cultural differences to be given expression in the public sphere.  This could be seen as 
providing a comparative context at least for the moderate unionism of the Alliance 
Party.  The difficulty with multiculturalist views is that they too are premised on an 
acceptance of the nature and boundaries of the state.  Multi-culturalism is seen as an 
expression of citizenship within a clearly defined state.  It has not to date been 
discussed in the context of contested and unsettled states.  Moderate unionists are 
closer to a multi-cultural position, generally arguing that giving nationalists a greater 
sense of ownership would reduce nationalist ‘alienation’ and ultimately stabilise the 
state. Even moderate unionists, however, set clear limits to what forms of pluralist 
expression are acceptable - rejecting for example nationalist criticisms of the RUC 
and the official use of overt symbols of Irish nationalism such as the tricolour.26  If 
multiculturalism is used as a comparative model for the position articulated by 
Alliance it is a limited pluralism, premised on the constitutional status quo and 
according allegiance to the British state, thus offering equality as an alternative to 
nationalism rather than in conjunction with it.  It is also, as represented by Alliance’s 
electoral support a minority and diminishing perspective within unionism. 
 
The ethnic model of citizenship, classically represented by the German system of 
citizenship through blood-line rather than residence at birth/naturalisation - has some 
similarities to mainstream unionists’ closed view of citizenship.  Its focus on 
‘belonging’ and its incapacity to fully integrate ‘new’ entrants reflect elements of the 
unionist perspective.  The classic ethnic model of citizenship does not, however, 
capture the totality of unionists’ exclusionary views.  Certainly in broad terms 
nationalists could be said to be excluded as an ethnic group, but fundamentally it is 
                                                          
24 Norman Porter, Rethinking Unionism: an Alternative Vision for Northern Ireland,  (Belfast: 
Blackstaff Press, 1996), 167-8. 
25 Irish Times, 16 June 1995. 
26 John Alderdice, Irish Times, 10 Jan. 1995. 
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their political allegiance rather than their ethnic inheritance which is at issue.  
Theoretically at least, unionists can include the mythical quiet Catholic who is not a 
nationalist.  It is nationalists’ political aspirations which are used to exclude them.  
Catholics who support the union can be allowed within the citizen band even if there 
are few in reality.  Perhaps more significantly, Protestants who ‘go native’ who take 
an anti-unionist political position are excluded despite their ‘ethnic’ inheritance.27  The 
nature of exclusion is driven by the political threat to the Union rather than by the 
dangers of cultural mixing highlighted by Barker and McVeigh as characterising ‘new 
racism’.28  Ethnic exclusion is traditionally characterised by a fear that allowing 
‘outsiders’ to enter the body politic will change the nature of society, simply because 
they are ‘different’.  In classic ethnic exclusion it is their presence and their difference 
which is highlighted and not their political aspirations.   In Northern Ireland, it is 
nationalists’ political opinions, the perceived threat from the Republic of Ireland, 
unionists’ image of the British government as an unreliable ally, and their siege 
mentality, which drives exclusionary politics within unionism and not a fear of ethnic 
dilution. 
 
There are other problems with trying to conceptualise mainstream unionism’s view of 
citizenship as simply a reflection of ethnic citizenship, primarily related to the nature 
of the Northern Ireland state.  The ethnic model as normally defined reflects the 
exclusion by a dominant community of relatively small minority ethnic communities, 
who are seeking inclusion, within a settled state.  In Germany for example there is no 
political demand for Turkish self-government and no threat to the dominant position 
of ‘ethnic-Germans’, even from a reasonably large Turkish community.  In Northern 
Ireland however it is the unsettled and contested nature of the state which defines 
ethnic communities. The term ‘minority’, even if mathematically accurate, conjures 
images of small communities not a cohesive group making up over 40% of the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Alliance Party submission to the Patten commission on the RUC, 15 Oct. 1998. 
27 See for example unionist reaction to Protestants in the Women's Coalition, in the business 
organisations or in the churches when they challenge mainstream unionist positions.   
e.g.  Jack McKee (DUP), NI Forum, 7 Feb. 1997, vol. 27, p. 46.  
        John Hunter (UUP), NI Forum, 24 Oct. 1997, vol. 48, p.10. 
        David Campbell (UUP), NI Forum, 13 June 1997, vol. 34, pp. 37-8. 
28 M. Barker, The New Racism (London: Junction. 1981) and Robbie McVeigh,  ‘Is Sectarianism 
Racism? Theorising the Racism/ Sectarianism Interface’, pp. 179-198 in David Miller (ed.) Rethinking 
Northern Ireland: Culture, Ideology and Colonialism.  (London: Longman, 1998). 
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population.  Furthermore there is a real and substantial possibility of change in state 
boundaries.  The ethnic model of citizenship as traditionally defined does not deal 
with these tensions and is therefore not adequate in analysing the politics of inequality 
in Northern Ireland. 
 
Ethnic models of citizenship, despite their common emphasis on exclusion, also have 
a difficulty in dealing with unionists’ relationship, as citizens, to the British state.  
Attitude surveys have shown an increase over the years in the proportion of unionists 
who use the  self-description ‘British’ to define their national or ethnic identity.29  
However it is not an identity that is accorded to them by most of the wider British 
public, who tend to see unionists as being outside of their own ‘imagined 
community’30.    These elements of the unionist position are also not captured in the 
traditional ethnic-citizenship model. 
 
It is the unsettled nature of the state historically and demographically which leads 
unionists to put such weight on the need for dominance and exclusion of nationalists 
and which leads them to see demands for equality of citizenship as a threat.  
Mainstream unionism believed that its strength prior to 1967 was built on hegemonic 
control as much as repressive control.  Opponents of the regime saw little prospect of 
change and so were less likely even to try to demand reform.  It is this hegemonic 
strength, not the precise structures of the pre-1972 Stormont government, which 
unionists wish to re-establish.  There is some division within unionism on the best 
way to achieve this, over devolution versus integration for example.  Mainstream 
unionists seek to defend their position not just against direct assaults on the partition 
settlement but against changes to the nature of citizenship within Northern Ireland.  
The loss of unionist hegemony is not simply a perception by unionists that they have 
lost power resources, it marks an actual shift in both symbolic and material power and 
represents a deepening of the ‘unsettled’ and contested nature of the Northern Ireland 
state.  Mainstream unionist elites do not therefore view their position on reform of 
                                                          
29 As shown in surveys by Rose, Richard, Governing without Consensus: An Irish Perspective.  
(London: Faber and Faber, 1971); Edward Moxon-Browne, Nation, Class and Creed in Northern 
Ireland, (Aldershot: Gower, 1983) and David Smith, Equality and Inequality in Northern Ireland: Part 
Three: Perceptions and views.  (London: Policy Studies Institute, 1987). 
30 Phrase from Benedict Anderson Imagined Communities: reflections on the origin and spread of 
nationalism, (London: Verso, 1991). 
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citizenship as unreasonable.   Compromise on the equality agenda is not an issue of 
‘low politics’ or of limited importance.  The proposition that if unionists gain on the 
constitution (through the principle of consent) they can give on equal citizenship does 
not fit within their paradigm.  Rather than trading ‘equality issues’ for security, 
mainstream unionism believes that a model of citizenship as implied in the ‘equality 
agenda’ would fatally weaken its own position by strengthening nationalism and 
therefore they are not easily persuaded to follow this approach in negotiations.  
 
The importance of the contested nature of the Northern Ireland state in unionist 
conceptions of citizenship lead to a political strategy based on resistance to reform 
and defence of the status quo.  This heightens unionists’ siege mentality and acts as a 
disincentive to political reform including moves towards equal citizenship.  There are 
also however pressures for change in citizen relations in Northern Ireland.  The 
increasing internationalisation of the Northern Ireland conflict, while adding 
somewhat to unionists’ sense of siege mentality also creates, at times, irresistible 
pressures for change. The split within unionism in response to the peace process and 
the Good Friday Agreement might be seen as evidence of an emerging different 
perspective on citizenship within unionism, or the Agreement itself could be viewed 
as a trade off between inclusiveness and constitutional guarantees for unionists. 
However, such interpretations would be a misreading of unionism’s reaction to the 
peace process.  The split on the Agreement and the decision by pro-agreement 
unionists to support the deal is best understood as a tactical divide in response to the 
changing political environment in which unionism operates.  The different tactical 
responses by unionists have created very sharp and bitter divisions but have not led to 
any ideological realignment.  There is little to suggest that pro-Agreement unionists 
have fundamentally altered their view of citizenship, but they have a stronger 
pragmatic sense of what is possible.  There was also a fear that the British and Irish 
governments might have implemented even more far reaching reforms over unionists’ 
heads if they had withdrawn from talks.31  It is therefore a tactical divide which is at 
the heart of this dispute in unionism, rather than an ideological disagreement on the 
nature of citizenship. 
                                                          
31 e.g. Anthony Alcock, NI Forum, 3 Oct. 1997, vol. 45, p.10. 
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A Changing International Environment 
Until the ending of the Cold War the international pressures for a resolution of the 
Northern Ireland conflict were very minimal.  Neither superpower had any significant 
interest in intervening. The USSR saw little potential beyond raising human rights 
issues as a trade off in forums such as the CSCE.  The USA was unwilling to 
challenge its most important NATO ally.  Despite the occasionally high profile of 
Irish-American political activity, US government policy was firmly within the context 
of the ‘special relationship’ with Britain.32  Northern Ireland was seen as an internal 
British affair and Irish governments were politely informed that the US administration 
would not intervene.33  Even during crisis situations such as the civil rights period and 
the 1981 hunger-strikes this policy held firm.34  Other international interventions were 
equally low key. The UN Security Council was never likely to get involved as Britain 
held a permanent seat and a veto.  The EEC/EC also took a minimalist view.35  No 
other government, apart from the Irish and British had any national interests to pursue 
and so the only other state level intervention came from rogue states such as Libya 
and Iran - with their own separate motives for attacking the British government.  
There were occasional signs of a countervailing view such as US President Jimmy 
Carter’s ban on arms sales to the RUC and Ronald Reagan’s pressure on Margaret  
Thatcher to sign the Anglo-Irish Agreement and there was constant NGO criticism of 
British policy in Northern Ireland but the level of international pressure was never 
enough to have a significant impact. 
  
The ending of the Cold War however opened up much greater possibilities.  It 
weakened or at least lessened the absolute priority accorded to strategic security and 
military alliances in US (and indeed British) foreign policy.  This gave Bill Clinton, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Reinforced even after the agreement during various difficulties in its implementation e.g. David Ervine 
(PUP),  Irish Times, 21 Jan. 1999.   
32 See Joseph O’Grady, ‘An Irish Policy Born in the USA’, Foreign Affairs, 75:2, (1996), 2-7. 
33 See Sean Cronin, Washington’s Irish Policy 1916 - 1986: Independence, Partition, Neutrality, 
(Dublin: Anvil Books, 1987), 192 and Dermot Keogh, Twentieth Century Ireland, (Dublin: Gill and 
Macmillan, 1994), 194. 
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the first US President elected  after the Cold War, the flexibility to pursue foreign 
policy goals which might strain relations with Britain.  Relieved of the overwhelming 
weight of Cold War concerns, Clinton could ignore the advice of the US State 
Department, the FBI and the CIA in granting Gerry Adams a visa to enter the USA36  
and in intervening more forcefully in the developing Irish peace process.  It is 
difficult to conceive a US President making those decisions during the Cold War.  
This is not to ignore the domestic pressure on Clinton, a product of his party’s need to 
win back Irish Americans who were part of the Reagan-Democrat bloc and also under 
pressure from a much more professional and influential Irish American lobby - itself 
partly a response to the changing strategy of Sinn Féin in Ireland.37  Both the 
domestic pressures and the urgings of Irish governments could have been ignored if 
global strategic interests were at stake.  The fact that the US administration and 
President Clinton personally have been so heavily involved in the negotiation process 
undeniably increased the pressure on political actors, including unionists, to reach 
agreement. 
 
Other international factors were also significant at this time.  Political conflicts and 
‘struggles’ which the Sinn Féin leadership had drawn inspiration from or sought to 
compare themselves with, in South Africa, Palestine and Central America were 
moving towards peace negotiations and settlements.38  The post-Cold War world 
would leave limited room for ‘national liberation movements’ which had drawn 
heavily on socialist ideology or Soviet support.  Though the Republican Movement 
did not face significant financial or military material losses they were affected by the 
political climate which these developments created and were part of.  At an 
ideological level, and in the case of South Africa at the level of extensive personal 
contacts,39 the emergence of international peace processes had a significant impact on 
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republican thinking.  Finally, in a post-Cold War world there was always the 
possibility that a British establishment, relieved of its Cold War fears, would be less 
antagonistic to new political arrangements for the island of Ireland, if a new dynamic 
could be created to put Northern Ireland on the international agenda.  A new military 
dynamic was unlikely, given the stalemate between the IRA and the British Army and 
RUC and so pressure mounted for a new ‘unarmed strategy’ with the republican 
movement. 
 
Prior to the end of the Cold War, unionists by virtue of their siege mentality had made 
limited use of international contacts.  Such parallels as were drawn tended to be with 
what were perceived as similar communities under siege such as Israel, Turkish 
Cypriots and apartheid South Africa or other ‘abandoned’ British settlers such as the 
white community in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe.40  As white rule became not only 
discredited but increasingly unstable it was clear that drawing such parallels did the 
unionist cause more harm that good.  Furthermore as the Israeli government opened 
talks with the PLO, and the white South African government with the ANC, so 
pressure mounted on unionists, and the British government, to engage with Sinn Féin 
and seek progress in Northern Ireland.   
 
These changes increased the pressure on unionism to engage with the mainstream 
international community and in particular with Washington.  Unionists could not 
credibly argue it was a purely internal ‘British’ matter when the British government 
was increasingly involving the Irish government in the search for a settlement41 and 
this added to the pressure to relate to the international community more seriously.  
Post cease-fire unionism has had a greater level of serious contact with the US 
administration than any previous generation of unionist leaders and it has not all been 
negative and defensive.  There is now a section of the UUP which believes it can 
engage with the USA - traditionally seen as unsupportive - and make progress.42  
Such engagement is however a two way process.  As unionist leaders deepen their 
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contact with senior US policy makers, so too are they open to pressure from the US to 
shift their own position in response to US efforts at mediation.  In many ways this is a 
follow on from the UUP’s self image as an insider group in Westminster politics and 
their preference for insider deals.  The emphasis placed by the UUP on their good 
contacts leaves them open to reverse pressure.  The influence of the White House and 
US talks chairperson George Mitchell during the negotiations is well documented43 
and the personal intervention of President Clinton in making phone calls to the 
leading negotiators including David Trimble on the eve of the Good Friday 
Agreement being reached is further evidence of the pressure for a settlement from the 
US administration. 
 
Domestic Pressures for Change 
In addition to these international influences unionist political elites had also to 
respond to the strategic changes within Irish nationalism and republicanism, itself 
strongly related to the changing international relations environment.  The strategic 
shifts in republican thinking and the response to those changes by Irish nationalists 
are crucial to the building of a new political environment for unionism.  It is 
important therefore to establish the fundamental basis of these strategic developments 
to contextualise the response of unionist political elites.   While unionism has held a 
relatively undifferentiated view of Irish nationalism, it has benefited from the sharp 
divisions within nationalist elites on the use of political violence.  The first signs of 
‘new thinking’ and the creation of a new political environment came in the late 1980s.   
Sinn Féin acknowledged publicly that the republican movement was not strong 
enough, on its own, to achieve a united Ireland and that therefore a ‘broad front’ of 
nationalist parties and organisations or a ‘nationalist consensus’ was required to 
achieve that goal.44   There followed a shift in attitudes to constitutional nationalism.45  
Though still rivals in elections and for leadership, the SDLP and the Irish government 
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(especially Fianna Fáil and to some extent Labour) were now seen as potential 
political allies rather than as simple collaborators with British rule.  In a new policy 
document Towards a Lasting Peace (1992) Sinn Féin placed the Irish government, 
and the need for a nationalist consensus, at the heart of its political strategy - marking 
a reversal of previous perspectives.   
 
The narrative of the peace process has been provided elsewhere, but it is clear that a 
new political momentum was released by the process.  The IRA cease-fire and the 
dynamic of the peace process quite suddenly placed Ulster unionism in a position 
where standing still was not an option. The actions of the Irish government, 
constitutional nationalism, the US administration and to some extent the EU, in 
seeking to reinforce the cease-fires and the peace process created a dynamic for 
political progress.  While the reliance of the Conservative British government led by 
John Major on UUP support at Westminster relieved some of the pressure on 
unionism, this rebounded on unionists when Labour came to power in Britain in May 
1997.  Determined not to follow the Conservative’s reluctant engagement with the 
peace process, and imbued with a generalised commitment to constitutional reform, 
the new Labour government, with its large Westminster majority added to the 
pressure on unionists to involve themselves actively in the process and that process 
was inevitably going to include reform of citizenship and developments in the 
equality agenda. 
 
Ulster Unionism was faced with an Irish nationalist consensus that was growing and 
becoming increasingly politically united.   In addition, the leaders of Irish 
nationalism, including northern nationalists, had formed an effective alliance with a 
US administration and a reasonable working relationship with the British Labour 
government which seemed likely to be in power for a considerable time.  Northern 
nationalists now made up over 40% of the voting population, moderate unionism as 
represented by Alliance could mobilise at least 5 or 6%; the centrist Northern Ireland 
Women’s’ Coalition (NIWC) 1% and the loyalist paramilitaries 3%.  Mainstream 
unionism, for the first time since Partition, was faced with the possibility that it could 
become an electoral minority within Northern Ireland.46  Nationalists were still a long 
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way from securing a majority for a united Ireland, but if nationalists were united they 
could clearly secure majority support in Northern Ireland in a referendum for far-
reaching political change.  The UUP leadership were quite explicit about this threat 
during the negotiations.  Antony Alcock argued that if the UUP walked out it  was 
likely that a section of mainstream unionists would vote in a referendum to accept a 
peace deal which had been negotiated in their absence.47  The bottom line for the UUP 
leadership was that however unhappy they were with key elements of the deal,  any 
likely alternative was going to be much worse from a unionist perspective. 
 
The rejection of the deal by the DUP, the smaller UKUP and UUP dissidents was not 
surprising as they had been on the record over many years as opposing compromises 
and reform well short of what was in the Good Friday agreement.  From Sunningdale 
to the present they have followed a relatively consistent position.  All mainstream 
unionist elites have traditionally insisted that there is little point having a veto on the 
‘final handover’ of sovereignty if they cannot prevent political decisions which 
change the character of the state and/or which move them towards a united Ireland.  
This position was articulated by all the major unionist parties, including those who 
ultimately supported the agreement, as recently as 1997.48  It is the adherence of the 
unionists who oppose the agreement to traditional unionist positions that presents 
difficulties for David Trimble.  He must convince unionists that either the 
commitments on sovereignty are more absolute now than they have been previously, a 
difficult task, or persuade unionists that they have little choice but to go down this 
route - a more accurate but politically difficult message to sell.49 
 
The importance of this analysis is not in coming to definitive conclusions as to the 
responses of Ulster unionism to the Good Friday Agreement but rather to show the 
limited extent to which the deal has required mainstream unionist elites to abandon 
the ideological basis of their previous positions.  The opponents of the deal might 
offer the clearest continuity with the traditional and exclusionary model of citizenship 
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but even those unionists supporting the deal have not, as yet, been required to break 
with it decisively.   The key elements of the mainstream unionist approach to the talks 
- the strong exclusionary view of citizenship, the resistance to accept internal reforms 
as a quid pro quo for constitutional guarantees and a lack of trust in British intentions 
- which have acted as a restraint on political reform are still visible in the public 
statements of mainstream unionists who support the agreement.50  It is also clear that 
the state is still contested and ‘unsettled’.  It is stretching credibility to suggest that 
Sinn Féin or indeed even the Irish state have ended their political ambitions for a 
united Ireland.  David Trimble focused on the ‘consent principle’ and the changes to 
Articles 2 and 3 to argue that the state is now more secure than previously and that 
therefore the Good Friday Agreement could be supported.  Paul Bew also argued this 
point.51  However the attitude of pro-Agreement unionist elites since the Agreement is 
not indicative of a group who believe their political future has been secured, rather the 
reluctance to engage with this process was outweighed by the considerable external 
pressures to enter talks and support the deal.  It was external pressure and innovative 
thinking in the framing of the Agreement rather than internal shifts in the nature of 
dominant ideologies in Northern Ireland which led to the Good Friday Accord.  It 
may be that pro-Agreement unionists and nationalists will fundamentally alter their 
political perspectives, over time, but it was not necessary for them to do so to sign the 
deal in April 1998.  The talks leading to the Agreement were successful not because 
of a change in internal attitudes to match the previous conflict resolution strategies, 
but rather due to the new international environment, related changes in Sinn Féin and 
because the designers of the Agreement moved beyond absolute sovereignty to create 
new visions of citizenship and governance. 
 
 
A new vision of citizenship? 
The centrality of the contested state to politics in Northern Ireland is by no means 
unique.  The period since the end of the Cold War has seen an increase in the level of 
secessionist challenges to existing states.  Initially the focus of this debate was limited 
to the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and it was assumed that the impact 
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would be limited to that geographical region or to former communist states.  
However, in Central Africa, the Middle East, East Timor, Eritrea/Ethiopia, Sudan, 
Quebec, Scotland and Spain, to give just some contemporary examples, there are now 
significant and continuing challenges to state boundaries.  It is also now clear that 
change in the territory of the former Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe was not a 
once off event but will have a continuing impact in the Russian border regions, the 
Caucuses and the Balkans at least.  Indeed, the sharp link between citizenship and 
national identity in contested states was starkly highlighted by the actions of the 
Serbian police in Kosovo during the 1999 conflict, in stripping fleeing Kosovars of 
their official badges of citizenship - passports, identity cards, birth certificates and 
even car registration plates.52  While not all of these states share the historic 
experience of Northern Ireland -  not all contested states enclose settler societies -  
secession and boundary change is no longer a marginal issue for international 
relations and academic debates need to reflect this changed environment.  
Specifically, the debate on citizenship needs to be able to move beyond its assumption 
of uncontested and settled nation states. 
 
Political conflict in contested states is almost by definition based on challenges to, 
and defence of, the political status quo.  In a situation where a dominant community 
has based their entire political programme around the defence of the status quo there 
is often no incentive for them to move or compromise on ideas of equal citizenship.  
External intervention is necessary to provide an incentive to move towards political 
negotiations and compromise.  The nature of international intervention in regional 
conflicts is, however, changing since the end of the Cold War.  Released from the grip 
of superpower confrontation, international and regional organisations have the 
potential to provide a more flexible response to regional conflicts.  The major 
international organisations and the dominant states within them, however, still act on 
the assumption that state borders are best left unchanged in most circumstances, 
though there are some shifts in this position in situations such as East Timor.  The 
Rambouillet plan for Kosovo, was also a departure of sorts in that it sought to 
guarantee by external intervention, levels of autonomy which in fact would have 
fundamentally changed the nature of citizenship in Kosovo.  This was reinforced in 
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the proposals by the French and German governments in early 1999 for EU or UN 
protectorate  status for Kosovo, within the Yugoslav federation.  
 
There is, however, no consistent basis for intervention by either international 
organisations or indeed by individual states, and realpolitik has left many outside 
such new dialogue for the moment at least.  The main international organisations such 
as the UN, or individual powers such as the USA, can in conflict situations, decide to 
uphold the status quo or insist on a search for a negotiated solution.  It is in the 
situation of engagement that new models of citizenship become a normative 
requirement, if solutions that combine justice with political stability are to be 
achieved.  As, interference in the ‘internal affairs’ of sovereign states is now out of 
the realm of superpower conflict, intervention is less likely to involve covert 
operations and aid to irregular forces and instead it is more likely to be based on 
formal and open public debates and interventions by the UN, NATO and the USA.  
The shift from covert or arms length operations to open interventions requires new 
procedures and agreements on the nature of, and the basis for, such decisions.  It also 
indicates a shift from interventions designed to secure a victory for one side to a 
process where mediation, peace negotiations and future external guarantees of 
citizenship rights are of greater relevance.  In the post-Cold War situation, there is a 
need for new models of citizenship and new modes of externally guaranteeing 
political agreements which may be based on a state remaining contested but where the 
form of the contest is peaceful rather than violent, in the hope that in an externally 
guaranteed ‘safe’ situation, a stable political solution can emerge over time.  The 
resort to military action against Iraq and Yugoslavia does not necessarily invalidate 
this argument. These attacks were designed to bomb political leaders into political 
submission or bring them to the negotiation table but the ‘enemy state’ was intended 
to survive the military strikes and thus ultimately negotiations were, and are, required 
to finalise the details of the new situation. 
 
These new forms of intervention are clearly developing in a security context framed 
by the collapse of the USSR and the emergence of the USA as an unchallenged single 
superpower.  There are however other dimensions to the post-Cold War international 
environment.  The increasing globalisation of news broadcasting gives secessionist 
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and sub-state political movements access to an international audience.  Coverage of 
famine, genocide and ‘ethnic cleansing’ can increase domestic pressure on western 
governments to ‘do something’.  This factor clearly influenced the US decision to 
enter Somalia.  However, in the context of US failure there, TV coverage was 
ultimately insufficient to mobilise them to act in Rwanda in 1994, though it may have 
prevented some Western governments seeking to maintain the Hutu regime in power.  
The growth of transnational social movements and lobby groups, most notably on the 
environment, but to some degree on human rights has also added to the capacity of 
civil rights or nationalist movements to link into a potential support network in 
industrialised societies.  The mobilisation of Irish Americans in the MacBride 
Principles campaign on fair employment in the mid 1980s and the efforts of the Irish 
American lobby to influence Bill Clinton during the 1990s is evidence in the Irish 
context of the growing linkages between domestic politics, transnational movements 
and foreign policy. 
 
In spite of the development of new pressures for intervention in regional conflicts 
there has been no equivalent debate on the new forms of citizenship and governance 
which will be needed to broker settlements in contested states.  The existing models 
of supranational governance or minority rights provisions are inadequate to the task.  
A new discourse on citizenship is required, that can explain developments in 
citizenship in contested states and that can create new models of citizenship capable 
of guaranteeing subordinate national or ethnic groups their citizenship rights outside 
the context of a ‘settled’ nation-state.  This is not simply a matter of allowing dual 
citizenship or making citizenship and allegiance a private choice.  Rather it requires 
changes in the public relationship between citizenship and state allegiance.  The 
dominant perspectives on citizenship are analytically inadequate when transported 
outside of their Anglo-American and continental western European origins.  The 
nature of citizenship in much of the world cannot be adequately analysed without 
situating citizen-relations in the context of the contested state - the context often 
having its roots in colonialism.  The existing literature does not explain the basis of 
the perspective on citizenship held by Ulster unionists.  Attempts which have been 
made to reduce all such conflicts to being, in effect, extreme versions of German 
ethnic-nationalism are not plausible.  Citizenship in Israel, for example, is about more 
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than alternative identities (though it includes an ethnic dimension): it is also grounded 
in Israel’s security dilemma, the wider Middle East conflict and the impact of settler 
colonial ideologies. 
 
Citizenship is not a unitary value - the product of a simple modernisation process.  
The model set out by T. H. Marshall of slowly evolving citizenship rights from civil 
to political to social is not (and was never intended by Marshall to be) an analytical 
paradigm for all societies.53  Rather, citizenship is part of the arena of political 
conflict and models of citizenship are part of the outcome of such conflicts.  Just as 
the national-democratic revolutions of the nineteenth century advanced demands for 
parliamentary democracy and political citizenship (at least for men), and the class 
conflicts of the nineteenth and twentieth century developed social rights in industrial 
democracies, so too do political conflicts over colonialism and over the boundaries 
and nature of the state mould the form of citizenship in contested states.  This 
relationship of politics to citizenship is recognised to a significant degree in debates 
on class and gender but it needs to be extended to include political conflicts over 
ethnic and national allegiances. 
 
A new discourse on citizenship in contested states, in addition to offering a much 
more convincing explanation of the nature of citizenship, and the perspectives held by 
political actors in such states, can also play a role in developing new visions of 
citizenship.  A new model of citizenship is clearly required in Northern Ireland and in 
other similar societies.  This vision of citizenship needs to assert that members of such 
national or ethnic communities have a right to all of the traditional and contemporary 
rights of citizens, while retaining their own identity and political aspirations, 
regardless of their unwillingness to give allegiance to the dominant state.  It must 
assert rights to equality such as employment, cultural rights, and a fair and acceptable 
form of policing.  These rights need to be clearly expressed in both individual and 
groups terms and need to be grounded in a commitment to see a new vision of equal 
citizenship reflected in concrete public policies, designed to promote actual equality 
of treatment between the communities. 
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Even with a commitment to guarantee traditional rights of citizenship outside the 
context of an agreed state, some of the issues of contention in Northern Ireland would 
remain unresolved.   For example, disputes over Orange marches and unionists’ 
insistence on a monopoly of British symbolism in the public space would not be 
resolved by reference to traditional debates on citizenship rights.  Disputes on the use 
of ‘political’ symbols are a common feature of conflict in contested states.54  An 
additional element is, therefore, also required if a new model of citizenship is to have 
a significant egalitarian impact.  In addition to guaranteeing contemporary forms of 
citizenship, such as civil, political and economic rights in a new context, a model of 
equal citizenship for contested states also needs to offer new rights of citizenship.  
Citizenship needs to be extended to include a specific right to hold allegiance to a 
nationalist identity other than the previously dominant one and to have that reflected 
in the culture of the public sphere. 
 
A new model of citizenship designed to operate in contested states therefore requires 
two distinct elements.  Firstly a new form of citizenship which is guaranteed outside 
the framework of an uncontested state and secondly an extension of citizenship to 
cover new types of rights - specifically, in the case of Northern Ireland, focused on 
nationalists’ right to have their group identity reflected in the ethos, culture and 
practice of the state. 
 
This requirement for new forms of citizenship will clearly often conflict with the 
realpolitik of individual political disputes.  There is at present no global structures of 
governance capable of providing any consistent guidelines for intervention.  Yet, as in 
the case of Northern Ireland, citizenship in contested states is only likely to be 
transformed with a significant international intervention.  Indeed almost by definition, 
a model of equal citizenship in a contested state will rely much more on transnational 
governance than citizenship in a ‘settled’ state.  Contemporary forms of transnational 
governance are too fragmented, based on power inequalities, inconsistent and 
dominated by US/Western realpolitik rather than ideas of supranational law, to 
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provide this external dimension on anything other than an ad-hoc basis.  Current 
international governance simply does not possess the necessary human rights and 
citizenship protections found in democratic states and which are needed to implement  
equal citizenship in contested states. 
 
Given the absence of suitable supranational institutions or legal mechanism, for the 
present at least, the only short-term potential for external mediation and mechanisms 
to guarantee citizenship in contested states is in the real political benefits such an 
approach can bring to key political players involved in the conflict, the protagonists, 
neighbouring states and interested international or regional powers.  If a new more 
equal model of citizenship can provide lasting and stable political settlements, it may 
play a useful role, even in a world dominated by realpolitik.  While this provides a 
less democratic and less consistent approach than a global or regional human rights 
and citizenship framework it is the motivation most likely to operate in practice. 
 
In Northern Ireland a combination of realpolitik, the historic and geographic 
framework, and the post-Cold War environment produced a type of external 
intervention which proved acceptable to the political actors and yet provided the 
necessary dynamic to push the peace process forward.  The role of the Irish and 
British governments operating as both political actors in their own right and also as 
external guarantors, combined with US mediation, proved successful in reaching an 
agreement in Northern Ireland.  There was also a history of external pressure on fair 
employment in particular, through the MacBride Principles campaign, but to some 
extent on policing, through reports from human rights groups and cases in the 
European Court of Human Rights.  Controversial Orange marches have in recent 
years also attracted many international observers adding to the pressure on the Orange 
Order to reimagine their parades as cultural rather than political events.  It is also 
clear that there are limit to this level of international intervention.  There are already 
signs that the two governments would like to move on to other priorities of their own 
and leave the implementation of the deal to the parties in Northern Ireland.  
Continuing high level US interest is not guaranteed beyond the Clinton Presidency.  
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However, without external pressure the Good Friday Agreement would not have been 
signed and without continuing external involvement it will not survive.  External 
intervention, in Northern Ireland cannot be seen as a once off mediation role at a 
conference or in negotiations, it will need to continue for some time. 
 
It is beyond the scope of this article to set out the parameters for such external 
intervention or specific elements for peace agreements on a global scale, but the 
Northern Ireland case does provide some indications of the important elements.  Irish 
government involvement in the early 1990s offered the Republican Movement an 
alternative strategy to armed struggle, in putting together a nationalist consensus to 
pressurise the British government towards a position of reform.  US involvement was 
seen to strengthen this alliance.  Continuing Irish government involvement as set out 
in the Agreement, the North-South Ministerial Council and its cross-border and all-
Ireland implementation bodies, also offer long-term constitutional links recognising 
the identity of nationalists in Northern Ireland and providing an institutional 
framework for North-South co-operation which is dynamic rather than static and 
which can develop over time.  British government involvement offered similar 
comfort to unionists, though never seen as equivalent by them.  The British 
government, as the sovereign power, also held out the threat that if no deal was 
reached then they could proceed with an imposed programme of reform including fair 
employment, cultural rights, a new police force, prisoner releases if the ceasefires 
held, and even a North-South council made up of nominated rather than elected 
persons.  US involvement produced individual decisions such as the visa for Gerry 
Adams, which helped produce a ceasefire, a mediation role during the talks and some 
external guarantee that the agreement would be implemented.  Crucially, however, the 
Good Friday Agreement contains institutions of transnational governance in the 
North-South Ministerial Council and the Inter-governmental conference (and to some 
extent in the British-Irish Council), which creates a structured basis for continued 
external involvement. 
 
The mediation role of ‘external’ players is however just one dimension of the Good 
Friday Agreement’s international significance.  More importantly perhaps, is its role 
in exploring new solutions to conflicts.  The provisions on equal citizenship are a 
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central part of the Agreement, seen by Republicans as offering a dynamic for future 
change which allowed them to accept a deal which re-affirms partition in the short to 
medium term.  Unionist opposition to equality measures are also placed, for the first 
time, in their proper context - as part of their broader political position, rather than a 
negotiating ploy, hiding a more accommodating bottom line.  Citizenship in contested 
states is part of the constitutional framework, not something separate from it - a 
second prize for the ‘losing’ side. 
 
Although many aspects of the Northern Ireland problem and peace process are 
specific to that conflict, there are a number of essential elements which could be the 
basis of peace agreements and new forms of citizenship elsewhere.  External pressure, 
recognition in institutional structures and in citizenship of competing national and 
ethnic identities, and external guarantees of security are likely to be important 
elements of a solution in many contested states.  These issues cannot be resolved 
within the state (by definition of it being contested) and cannot at present be 
guaranteed at the global level because there is no agreement on the basis on which 
intervention should take place.  The international literature on citizenship needs to 
address these issues around the nature and mode of external intervention and the 
forms of citizenship which might be developed in such peace processes.  The direct 
link between citizenship and the traditional national ideal reflected in the nation state 
can in this way be loosened, if not quite broken.  The Northern Ireland case certainly 
emphasises the importance of external involvement to overcome the almost inevitable 
lack of internal dynamic towards a peaceful solution in such conflicts.  The 
negotiations in Northern Ireland, were also from the outset structured to link elements 
of transnational governance and the implementation of citizenship rights in the 
equality agenda.  Under the procedure of ‘sufficient consensus’ in decision making 
and ‘nothing is agreed until everything is agreed’, mainstream unionists could only 
block the North-South body and the equality issues at the cost of collapsing the talks.  
The Good Friday Agreement also points towards new models of citizenship more 
appropriate to contested states than those traditionally discussed in the academic 
literature and drawn upon in conflict resolution strategies.  Though still in a state of 
transition, the Good Friday Agreement has a great deal to offer an international debate 
on equal citizenship in contested states.  
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